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Commercializing University Research in Transition Economies: Technology Transfer Offices 1 
or Direct Industrial Funding?  2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
 5 
There is a paucity of knowledge on research commercialization by university scientists worldwide. 6 
The objective of this paper is to identify the role that Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) and 7 
direct Industrial Funding play in university research commercialization in transition economies of 8 
Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan during 2015-2017. We do this by developing a novel  database 9 
and a multi-level model which explains how individual attributes, organizational and ecosystem 10 
characteristics explain the extent of knowledge commercialization .   11 
We apply the generalized Heckman approach to account for two selection biases, reducing the 12 
sample from 2,602 to 272 scientists, and further use a mixed-method approach to analyse 27 face-13 
to-face interviews with researchers and TTO managers.  The results demonstrate that research 14 
commercialization is not associated with the existence and awareness of TTO or the establishment 15 
of commercialization contracts via TTO, but the direct industrial funding of university research. 16 
Taken together the findings have clear implications for scholars, scientific entrepreneurs, TTOs and 17 
investors who aim to exploit university knowledge in transition economies. 18 
 19 
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1. Introduction 25 
 26 
The role of contemporary universities has become multifaceted (Etzkowitz et al. 2000; 27 
Bishop et al., 2011; Perkmann et al. 2011a, 2013; Hvide and Jones, 2016) and encompasses 28 
teaching, research and entrepreneurship function (Audretsch, 2014).  Universities implement far-29 
reaching changes to become more entrepreneurial (Mets, 2009; Siegel and Wright, 2015; 30 
Cunningham and  Link, 2015; Díez-Vial and Montoro-Sánchez, 2016) and technology transfer 31 
processes are being set up to promote research commercialisation (Lockett et al., 2003; Lockett and 32 
Wright, 2005; Phan and Siegel, 2006). Research commercialization requires  building a strong 33 
external partnership with ecosystem stakeholders (Bogler, 1994; Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007; 34 
Bekkers and Freitas, 2008; Miller et al. 2014; Acs et al. 2017)  such as entrepreneurs,  universities, 35 
local and national government  , private industry.  36 
The financial returns from and mechanisms of university knowledge transfers have remained 37 
under researched and have triggered an interest across entrepreneurship scholars and policy makers 38 
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in developed countries (Chapple et al., 2005; Wright et al. 2006; Kenney and Patton, 2009; Kalar 39 
and Antoncic, 2015; Abreu et al. 2016) and developing countries (Sedaitis, 2000; Varblane et al. 40 
2007a, 2007b; Bajmócy et al. 2010; Marozau and Guerrero, 2016; Guerrero and Urbano, 2017).  41 
Responding to public research commercialization opportunities, universities have explored a 42 
number of models of university knowledge transfer with entrepreneurship centres, university 43 
incubators, science parks and TTOs performing a role of a conduit (Link et al. 2007; Siegel et al. 44 
2003, 2007; Wright et al. 2008;  Kenney and Patton, 2009; Muscio, 2010; O’Kane et al. 2015; 45 
Kolympiris and Klein, 2017).  46 
Although substantial research in the field of academic entrepreneurship has been conducted 47 
in developed economies (Siegel et al. 2003, 2004; Powers and Mcdougall, 2005; Phan and Siegel, 48 
2006; Perkmann et al. 2011a, 2011b; Ankrah and al-Tabbaa, 2015; Mosey et al. 2017), the field 49 
remains fragmented and incomplete in transition economies (Varblane et al. 2007a, 2007b; Marozau 50 
and Guerrero, 2016). Empirical evidence of how knowledge spills at universities and reaches 51 
industry is very limited in these countries (Radosevic, 1998; Kwiek, 2012; Leydesdorff et al. 2015; 52 
Huyghe et al. 2016).  53 
There is a lack of relevant data on the mechanisms of knowledge transfer from universities, 54 
regulation, incentives, culture and the external investment in research (Tchalakov et al. 2010). 55 
While the TTOs remains a new phenomenon, direct industrial funding has demonstrated its strength 56 
as a conduit of university knowledge transfer (Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009; Czarnitzki et al. 57 
2015, 2016).  Direct industrial funding is defined as industry’s direct financial support for the 58 
development of technology by a university scientist(s). To the best of our knowledge,  no research 59 
to date has established and empirically tested the role that university TTO and direct industrial 60 
funding play in research commercialization by scientists in transition economies (Grimaldi et al. 61 
2011; Bradley et al. 2013; Guerrero et al. 2016; Theodoraki and Messeghem, 2017). This study 62 
bridges the gap.  63 
Adopting the TTO perspective  of the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship 64 
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(KSTE) in organizations (Acs et al. 2013; Shu et al. 2014) and the stakeholder perspective to 65 
entrepreneurship ecosystem framework (Grimaldi et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2014), we respond to the 66 
call in academic entrepreneurship literature (Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011; Perkmann et al. 2011a, 67 
2011b, 2013; Siegal and Wright, 2015; Mosey et al. 2017) and entrepreneurship ecosystem 68 
literature (Acs et al. 2014; 2017) - to investigate research commercialization in transition 69 
economies, while accounting for a broad range of individual, organizational and ecosystem level 70 
characteristics (Link and Siegel, 2005; Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009; Kenney and Patton, 2009; 71 
Stam and Spigel, 2017). These characteristics include professional level attributes such as amount 72 
of local and international publications, position, workload, research sponsorship, TTO collaboration 73 
and awareness as well as organizational level characteristics (university ownership, availability of 74 
TTO, contract relationship with TTO) and ecosystem level  characteristics related to scientist’s 75 
research funding by government, private industry in a home country and abroad, affiliated 76 
university, foreign  universities or institutions, non-for-profits, other public organizations). 77 
We start with the premise that there is a substantial variation in traditional and alternative 78 
models of university technology transfer (Siegel et al,. 2003, 2004; Kenney and Goe, 2004; Bradley 79 
et al. 2013), that governs scientist’s decision-making on research commercialization (Kenney and 80 
Patton, 2009). 81 
We use the unique primary data on 2,602 scientists collected by online survey in Belarus, 82 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan between November 2015 and August 2017. Having applied for two 83 
potential selection bias corrections: one for commercialization income disclosure and another for 84 
commercialization activity, our final model consists of 272 scientists. Belarus, Kazakhstan and 85 
Azerbaijan are representative transition economies with substantial research commercialization  86 
activity, with residents and non-residents currently hold 2503 (Belarus), 3218 (Kazakhstan) and 345 87 
(Azerbaijan) World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) active patents (WIPO, 2018). 88 
We validate our empirical findings with a mixed-method analysis of 27 face-to-face 89 
interviews with researchers and TTO managers during April 2016 – September 2017. A mixed 90 
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method approach was demanded, because we had a compelling reason to suspect that measuring 91 
and analysing the commercialization of university research by relying solely upon data collected by 92 
the TTOs (Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011) or universities (Caldera and Debande, 2010) may lead to 93 
a systematic underestimation of knowledge transfers.   94 
Taken together our results suggest that TTO activity neither impede nor facilitate research 95 
commercialization by scientists, while direct industrial funding stands as an efficient conduit for 96 
research commercialization. Although most scientists expressed their support to the “Professor 97 
Privilege” –type system (Hvide and Jones, 2016), vesting ownership with the inventor (Kenney and 98 
Patton, 2009) may take years in the troubled transition context.  99 
The next section introduces the theoretical framework and formulates the research 100 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 describes results. Section 5 101 
discusses the paper’s main findings and section 6 concludes. 102 
 103 
2. Background Literature 104 
2.1 Knowledge transfers from universities to industry 105 
Over the years, several scholars have studied the process of transferring knowledge from 106 
universities (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Grimaldi et al. 2011; Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011; 107 
Freitas et al. 2013; Díez-Vial  and Montoro-Sánchez, 2016; Guerrero et al. 2016) which could be 108 
either intentional (knowledge transfer) or unintentional (knowledge spillover) (Audretsch et al. 109 
2005; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2009). Prior research identified stakeholders that facilitate 110 
knowledge adoption and commercialization such as TTO, and the channels of commercialization, 111 
such as licencing technology (Bradley et al. 2013) and university spin-offs, that represent one of the 112 
most visible forms of knowledge transfer (Di Gregorio and Shane 2003; Lockett et al. 2003).  Even 113 
though the knowledge transfer is often formalized (Siegel et al. 2003, 2004), the role of scientists in 114 
the knowledge transfer is not obvious (van Looy et al. 2004; Grimaldi et al. 2011). The term 115 
scientist is used as a descriptor for a university researcher. 116 
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As in any entrepreneurial process, there are individual, organizational and contextual filters 117 
that limit the knowledge transfer and prevent a complete transformation of knowledge into 118 
economically viable products (Acs et al. 2013; Guerrero and Urbano, 2014; Shu et al. 2014). The 119 
economics of entrepreneurship allows us to understand the main environmental factors that 120 
influence the organizational filters (Guerrero and Urbano 2012, 2014; Miller et al. 2014), while the 121 
KSTE  explains the role of regional, organizational and individual characteristics in the knowledge 122 
transfer (Kenney and Goe, 2004; Guerrro and Urbano 2014; Urbano and Guerrero, 2013; Shu et al. 123 
2014). The “Bayh-Dole” Act and “Professor Privilege” system are often used as an example to 124 
explain how individual, organizational and contextual filters could be effectively leveraged so that 125 
knowledge transfer takes place between scientists and industry (Perkmann and Walsh, 2010; 126 
Grimaldi et al. 2011; Aldridge and Audretsch 2011; Hvide, and Jones, 2016).  127 
Unlike European economies (Wright et al. 2007, 2008), transition and developing 128 
economies have never experienced neither  “Bayh-Dole”-type regulation in the US (So et al. 2008; 129 
Korosteleva and Belitski, 2017) nor “Professor Privilege –type system in Germany (Czarnitzki et al. 130 
2015) and Norway (Hvide and Jones, 2016). Studies seeking to explain knowledge transfer from a 131 
university using the KSTE at the organizational and individual levels (Audretsch et al. 2005; Acs et 132 
al. 2013; Guerrero and Urbano, 2014)  have identified a number of internal (organisational) and 133 
external (environmental) factors that either facilitate or impede the process of knowledge transfer. 134 
One important factor is the establishment of a university TTO (Siegel and Wessner, 2012; Siegel 135 
and Wright, 2015) and engagement with private industry (Clarysse and Moray 2004; Boardman and 136 
Ponomariov, 2009; Clarysse et al. 2011; Díez-Vial  and Montoro-Sánchez, 2016).  The differences 137 
between the traditional KSTE and a TTO perspective of the KSTE are described in Table 1 using 138 
Shu’s et al. (2014) classification criteria. 139 
 140 
Table 1. A TTO perspective of the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship 141 
 Traditional KSTE framework KSTE in TTOs 
Empirical existence National and regional levels (Acs et al. 2013, 
2014; Audretsch, 2014) 
Organizational level (Shu et al. 2014) with 
an individual perspective of the KSTE 
(Guerrero  and Urbano, 2014) and 
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university perspective (Audretsch  et al. 
2005; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2009) 
Theoretical bases Endogenous growth theory (Arrow, 1962) 
KSTE in various contexts  (e.g. university, 
region, city) (Audretsch et al. 2005; Shu et 
al. 2014) 
Entrepreneurship ecosystem theory (Stam, 
2015; Stam and Spigel, 2017) , the 
evolution of technology transfer 
competencies at universities (Clarysse et 
al. 2011; Ankrah and Al-Tabbaa, 2015)  
Contextual factors Regional level and entrepreneurship 
environment (Kenney and Patton, 2005; 
Agarwal et al. 2010) 
University entrepreneurial orientation 
(Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011; Grimaldi 
et al. 2011; Kalar and Antoncic, 2015) 
Knowledge filters Formal and informal institutions (risk 
aversion of stakeholders, legal restrictions, 
bureaucracy, labour market rigidities, taxes, 
and lack of cognition and trust) (Agarwal et 
al. 2010; Shu et al. 2014) 
Knowledge management and 
commercialization (Audretsch, 2014). 
Knowledge spillovers Investment in knowledge, collaboration and 
labour mobility (Acs et al 2013), creativity 
(Audretsch and Belitski, 2013) 
Knowledge transfer and knowledge 
spillover from the university to ecosystem 
stakeholders (Grimaldi et al. 2011; 
Guerrero and Urbano, 2014) 
Relationship 
between knowledge filters 
and spillovers 
Indirect (Agarwal et al. 2010; Acs et al. 
2013) 
Indirect (Acs et al. 2013) 
Consequences Entrepreneurial performance is measured at 
regional or national levels (new business 
start-ups, survival, quality of 
entrepreneurship, high growth)  
Commercialization income of a scientist 
and/or TTO 
Source: Authors with criteria adopted from Shu et al (2014) 142 
 143 
 144 
2.2. Determinants of  knowledge commercialization: a multilevel model 145 
The process of research commercialization is a multi-level and involves interactions between 146 
an individual researcher, a university and the external environment (Powers and McDougall 2005; 147 
Guerrero and Urbano, 2014; Theodoraki and Messeghem, 2017). Freitas et al. (2013) distinguish 148 
two modes of interaction: the institutional mode, which involves interactions between the university 149 
and ecosystem stakeholders (industry, government, non-for-profit, angel investors); and the 150 
personal contractual mode, which is a formal and informal collaboration between ecosystem 151 
stakeholders and scientists, carried out with or without the direct involvement of a university. 152 
Building on Freitas et al. (2013), Grimaldi et al. (2011), Perkmann et al. (2011a, 2013) and 153 
Guerrero and Urbano (2014), Figure 1 illustrates a three-level model of university research 154 
commercialization, which connects scientist’s behaviour, organizational structures and ecosystem 155 
environment factors (Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011).  156 
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 157 
 158 
Figure 1: Multi-level model of university research commercialization  159 
 160 
The first (system/ecosystem) level of analysis focuses on the business and socioeconomic 161 
environment (Cooke et al., 1997;  Stam, 2015; Audretsch and Belitski, 2017; MIT REAP, 2017).  162 
National innovation activity, intellectual property (IP) and other institutional reforms (So et al. 163 
2008), the role that policy makers can have in the university’s commercialization activities (Florida 164 
and Kenney 1988) and the variety of entrepreneurship ecosystem stakeholders either support or 165 
impede research commercialization. According to existing literature on entrepreneurial ecosystems 166 
the presence of stakeholders facilitates entrepreneurial decision-making (Audretsch  et al. 2005; 167 
Audretsch, 2014; Ankrah and Al-Tabbaa, 2015; Stam, 2015). When the entrepreneurial ecosystem 168 
context is conducive, scientists at universities will leverage available resources and information via 169 
engagement with ecosystem stakeholders to transfer and commercialize new knowledge (Perkmann 170 
and Walsh, 2010; Acs et al., 2017). This creates strong links between scientists and university 171 
TTOs, where the invention is initially disclosed as well as between university and industry, where 172 
the invention is adopted and commercialized. Once the invention has been disclosed, TTOs will 173 
decide whether or not to further commercialize it (acquire a patent, discuss commercials potential 174 
Scientist entrepreneur decision -making and 
returns to commercialization (individual level)
University characteristics (TTO, technoparks, 
incubators), form of ownership (private, public, 
mixed) (organizational level)
Country formal and informal institutions ,  
socioeconomic conditions and collaboration with 
entrepreneurial ecosystem  stakeholdres (venture 
capital, private capital, public institutions, 
government) (system level).
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the prospective users, market technology, negotiate licencing agreements, licence technology) 175 
(Cooke et al., 1997;  Siegel et al. 2004; Link and Siegel, 2005; Shu et al., 2014). For this reason, the 176 
theoretical framework used to study the interaction between a university and ecosystem 177 
stakeholders, builds on the TTO’s perspective of the KSTE.    178 
In contrast, an entrepreneurship ecosystem with weak institutional context works in the 179 
opposite fashion (Wright et al., 2006, 2008). Below are the few examples. First, instead of 180 
disclosing the information to TTOs, which will later market the technology to organizations and 181 
entrepreneurs, providing revenues to the university, scientists will choose directly interact with 182 
private companies  bypassing the university administration and TTOs (Thursby and Thursby, 2004). 183 
To access the extent of the alternative modes of research commercialization it is necessary to study 184 
the individual level data, measuring the relationship between scientist’s behaviour and individual 185 
commercialization income. Second, as the invention has never been disclosed, the TTO will not be 186 
able to market it to entrepreneurs and organizations, will not negotiate the licence and not sign the 187 
licencing agreement. For this reason, the theoretical framework used to study the interaction 188 
between a scientist and ecosystem stakeholders, builds on the stakeholders’ perspective to 189 
entrepreneurship ecosystem framework (Grimaldi et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2014; Stam, 2015; MIT 190 
REAP, 2017; Acs et al. 2014, 2017; Audretsch and Belitski, 2017). The literature distinguishes 191 
between five potential groups of ecosystem stakeholders who may be involved in university 192 
research commercialization: entrepreneurs, risk capital providers, universities (TTOs), policy 193 
makers (government) and large corporations (private industry). 194 
The second (organizational) level of analysis focuses on universities and their ownership, the 195 
administrative structures within them that support research commercialization (TTOs, academic 196 
departments, techno parks, incubators) (Carayol and Matt, 2004; Audretsch et al., 2005; Dasgupta 197 
and David, 1994; Guerrero et al., 2016). The university level explains the efforts by university 198 
TTOs to seek out new commercialization opportunities (Siegel et al., 2004, 2007; Clarysse et al., 199 
2004, 2011), facilitate early evaluation of IP rights strategies, exploit infrastructure, stimulate 200 
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specific venture initiatives and spin-offs (Kenney and Patton, 2005; Wright et al., 2007, 2009), and 201 
attract public and private funds (Degroof and Roberts, 2004; Wright et al. 2009; Mosey et al. 2017). 202 
Several successful initiatives to support academic and student entrepreneurship have been 203 
implemented in developed countries, for example the Carolina Express Licensing Agreement, 204 
University of Missouri and University of Texas, University of California San Diego cases, the 205 
Stanford University Network, and others (Mustar et al., 2006; Chapple et al., 2005; Grimaldi et al. 206 
2011). However, universities in many developing and transition countries do not have the same 207 
organizational flexibility or high-quality academic entrepreneurship ecosystems.  208 
While the TTO was not an invention of national regulation in transition economies, as with 209 
their counterparts in developed countries, the TTOs activities include, but not limited to collecting 210 
information on their external partners, registering contracts and protecting the IP (Lockett et al., 211 
2003; Markman et al., 2005b; Lockett and Wright, 2005; Siegel et al., 2007; Perkmann et al., 2013; 212 
Huyghe et al., 2016). To illustrate wider TTO’s functions in transition economies, we use an 213 
example of TTO in a leading regional university in Belarus which includes collection, analysis, 214 
creation of a data banks, dissemination and collection of information on research activities of the 215 
university and enterprise needs; participation in conferences, seminars, exhibitions; registration and 216 
signing contacts between university and researchers as well as industry; implementation of 217 
scientific research, exchange of scientific and technical information with national and foreign 218 
institutions, provision of information to other technology transfer centres; facilitation of scientific 219 
research and development; training scholars and researchers (GSTU, 2017). Two important TTo 220 
functions are missing. First, evaluating the invention and deciding whether or not to pursue 221 
acquiring a patent (copyright, trademark). This is usually done in negotiation with scientists and 222 
potential user of the invention. Second, investing in invention  as well as involvement of scientists 223 
in the further stages of extensive adaptation of invention (Bradley et al. 2013).   224 
Finally, at the individual level of analysis, we observe the individual characteristics of 225 
scientists and incentives that lead scientists to become involved in the commercialization of 226 
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invention (van Looy et al. 2004; Jain et al. 2009; Guerrero and Urbano, 2014) and facilitating 227 
knowledge spillovers (Audretsch, 2014). Scientist’s decision-making and a choice of the knowledge 228 
transfer model is affected by the ecosystem and university levels, and in particular by their 229 
perception of the efficiency of the organizational mechanisms (TTOs, incubators, techno parks and 230 
so on) (Kenney and Patton, 2009; Kolympiris and Klein, 2017). The theoretical framework has its 231 
roots in the field of Entrepreneurial Theories (ET), investigating the individual attributes and 232 
incentives (Kenney and Patton, 2005; Jain, et al. 2009; Parkmann et al. 2013; Guerrero and Urbano, 233 
2014) which affect how research is commercialized (Thursby and Thursby, 2004).  234 
 235 
2.3. Conceptual model and research hypotheses.  236 
The process of research commercialization is multi-dimensional (Figure 1). Firstly, individual 237 
characteristics matter (e.g. position, field of science (basic, applied), proportion of time dedicated to 238 
research versus teaching, administration or commercialization, age of scientists, number of research 239 
publications) (Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011). Secondly, university environment, institutions (e.g. 240 
TTO, Centers for commercialization) and university ownership matter (Algieri et al. 2013). Thirdly, 241 
the ecosystem stakeholders influence the entrepreneurial efforts and decision-making on research 242 
commercialization (Kenney and Patton 2009).  243 
A traditional university knowledge transfer model (Siegel et al. 2003) includes the active role 244 
of organizational mechanisms in facilitating research commercialization (Bradley et al. 2013). The 245 
academic entrepreneurship concludes that organizational mechanisms are not homogeneous across 246 
universities (Mowery et al. 2004). Availability of financial resources and practice-oriented staff, a 247 
strong business reputation and a number of successfully-completed contracts since the TTO was 248 
established (Markman et al., 2005a), are important if TTOs are to market invention and to generate 249 
new university start-ups and spin-offs (Meyer 2003; Siegel et al., 2003).  250 
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The prior literature also questions the efficiency of TTOs as facilitators of research 251 
commercialization (Siegel et al., 2007; Wright et al., 2007; Kenney and Patton, 2009; Markman et 252 
al., 2005b; Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011; Perkmann et al., 2013).  253 
Aldridge and Audretsch (2011), who studied a sample of highly productive scientists in the 254 
US found that 30% would choose a ‘backdoor route’ to commercialization. Although the process of 255 
direct market commercialization by researchers is complex and requires substantial financial 256 
resources, if the TTO is perceived as a barrier then the scientist will attempt to bypass it (Link et al. 257 
2007). Broadman and Ponomariov (2009) applied the university perspective using the national 258 
survey of tenured and tenure-track scientists in the US “research intensive” sectors explain, why 259 
university scientists choose direct interactions with private companies in commercialization of 260 
technology, instead of  going a traditional TTO route (Siegel et al. 2004).  261 
In the context of post-socialist economies (Marozau and Guerrero, 2016), TTO face high level 262 
of university bureaucracy, absence of economic motivation for TTO staff to commercialize 263 
inventions, lack of financial resources to independently market technology, lack of freedom in 264 
decision-making to acquire a patent, lack of industry engagement and networking (Kerr and Nanda, 265 
2009; Yegorov, 2009). Altogether these factors create significant organizational filters to 266 
knowledge transfer and spillover via TTOs (Siegel et al. 2003; Mowery et al., 2004; Powers and 267 
McDougall, 2005; Mustar et al., 2006; Huyghe et al., 2016). 268 
Firstly, and the least of scientist’s concern, disclosure of invention puts the novelty of the 269 
invention at risk of reengineering and copying by competitors, if TTOs staff starts marketing the 270 
invention before the IP protection is sought (Lockett and Wright, 2005; Berman, 2008). The pay-271 
scale in the public sector in transition economies limits the hiring of competent TTO staff and 272 
economic motivation (Wright et al., 2008), which increases the risks of non-commercialization or 273 
unintended knowledge outflows. 274 
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Secondly, high level of bureaucracy and weak IP rights regulation may postpone application 275 
for a patent  and partner search (Siegel et al., 2003), increasing the time from the discovery to 276 
adoption by industry.  277 
Thirdly, complex and restrictive IP rights clauses included by university TTOs lawyers 278 
discourage ecosystem stakeholders to collaborate (Freitas et al., 2013). When marketing technology 279 
to industry, the TTO should be efficient in navigating conflicts of interests and values between  a 280 
scientist, university and a private firm (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004), which rarely happens. 281 
Monetary benefits are of great concern to both  TTO and a firm,  with TTOs having obtained IP 282 
rights on patented technology may be hard to negotiate. A widely-used public university practice in 283 
transition economies is to take away the IP right from the inventor (Marozau and Guerrero, 2016).  284 
Fourthly, technology adoption typically requires ongoing collaboration with the inventor  in 285 
order to commercialize technology, which may become difficult as inventor does not hold property 286 
rights and may refuse to collaborate. Unlike in the US, when university scientists receive federal 287 
grants (Bercovitz et al. 2001), in the transition economies, university receives government grants to 288 
serve large publicly-owned enterprises with new technology, where the economic interests of 289 
scientists are not considered (Marozau and Guerrero, 2016) and the invention is fully-owned by a 290 
university or a national government.  291 
Fifthly, major part of university inventions are nascent in nature and “years away from 292 
commercialization” (Bradley et al. 2013: 586). The original invention may be significantly changed 293 
at adaptation and utilization stages with or without inventor’s involvement in a process, increasing 294 
the uncertainty and risk for a TTO.  295 
One of the interesting facts acknowledged in the recent TTO literature (Grimaldi et al. 2011; 296 
Siegel and Wessner, 2012;  Kolympiris and Klein, 2017) is that universities may have few research 297 
results worth commercializing, in particular due to embryonic nature of technology which may 298 
require significant further modifications (Bradley et al. 2013).  299 
Finally, for universities in transition economies, TTO is a new phenomenon, because there 300 
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was little need for mechanisms of knowledge commercialization and IP right protection in a highly 301 
centralized planning system with stable production chains (Yegorov, 2009). The regulation aiming 302 
to encourage university knowledge transfer has now just begun to develop. 303 
For example, Presidential Decree #59 on the Commercialization of the Results of Scientific 304 
and Technological Activities Created at the Expense of Public Funds (Etalonline 2013), known as 305 
the ‘Belarusian Bayh-Dole act’, tends to confer the IP rights arising from state-funded R&D to 306 
universities that receive funding. This legislative initiative is of great importance, since research 307 
institutes and university R&D expenditures are funded primarily from the state budget (66%). 308 
Meanwhile funding from universities is negligible, accounting for less than 1% (Scienceportal, 309 
2014). 310 
Although TTOs could have created synergistic networks among scientists, industry, university 311 
and governments (Bercovitz et al. 2001; Miller et al. 2014), connecting inventors to ecosystem 312 
stakeholders that want to adopt university technologies, in transition economies, the implementation 313 
of Etzkowitz’s (2003) model of knowledge transfer remains limited. A TTO is often perceived by 314 
scientists as an additional bureaucratic structure “registering overhead costs” which is “just there” at 315 
university (Yegorov, 2009; Marozau and Guerrero, 2016).  Scientists in transition economies are 316 
likely to choose alternative models of research commercialization (formal and informal) (Boardman 317 
and Ponomariov, 2009). We hypothesize: 318 
H1: In transition economies there is a neutral impact of TTOs on university research 319 
commercialization.  320 
 321 
The traditional model of university knowledge transfer (Siegel et al. 2003, 2004) does not 322 
accurately capture the complexities of the process.  For example, the marketing of invention does 323 
not usually start before the TTO pursues a patent, TTO gauges the industry interest before investing 324 
resources into IP protection and further research (Bradley et al. 2013). In troubled transition 325 
economies with weak institutions and dominance of public sector in science, Etzkowitz’s (2003) 326 
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and Kenney and Patton’s (2009) research commercialization models may not exactly work. First, 327 
the ownership is never vested with an inventor to freely choose the commercialization route. 328 
Second, inventor as a university employee may not receive a market price when contracting with 329 
TTO. Third, loopholes in labor market regulation allow scientists to be full- or part-time employed 330 
by a private firm (profit or non-for-profit) as well as perform entrepreneurial activities jointly with 331 
industry (e.g. guest talks, paid consulting, technology transfer, copyrights, mentoring, supervising, 332 
testing products). In these circumstances an alternative university knowledge transfer model is 333 
applied. 334 
To formulate an alternative knowledge transfer model, Heinzl et al (2013) look into factors 335 
that can influence university technology transfer performance, such as research funding, 336 
organizational environment, ecosystem stakeholders and the mechanisms of technology transfer. 337 
Financial resources to commercialize an invention is one of the biggest issues confronting scientists 338 
(Kerr and Nanda 2009). It is widely acknowledged (Clarysse and Moray, 2004, 2006; Bekkers and 339 
Freitas, 2008; Clarysse et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2014) that the direct industrial funding may provide 340 
needed resources (Etzkowitz, 2003). The process starts from commercial and societal needs when 341 
firms seek academic resources before contacting a university or scientist to commercialize the 342 
technology (Van Rijnsoever et al. 2008).  343 
Except of private industry, who has already identified and use the technology (Aldridge and 344 
Audretsch, 2011), other ecosystem stakeholders (e.g. banks and venture capitalists) are unlikely to 345 
directly finance university research. This is due to the high risk and asymmetric information on the 346 
market value of invention (Kerr and Nanda, 2009; Perkmann et al. 2011) and inability to market 347 
invention (Sedaitis, 2000; Leydesdorff et al., 2015).  348 
Empirical precedents for assessing the impact of direct industrial funding of university 349 
technology have found that having industry grants increases the involvement of university scientists 350 
in rapid technology development and collaboration with scientists working in private companies 351 
(Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007), having industry grants increases the likelihood of interacting with 352 
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private firms in any capacity, including informal knowledge exchanges as well as performance of 353 
entrepreneurial activities (Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009), having industry grants increases the 354 
favourable attitudes towards university-industry collaboration (Bogler 1994) as well as academic 355 
entrepreneurship activity and publication rates (Van Looy et al. 2004). The links and the degree of 356 
industry involvement is the result of individual and mutual choices in a two-sided market of 357 
scientists and private firms (Banal-Estanol et al, 2015). 358 
Private companies identify technologies that they wants and directly fund research projects at 359 
universities (Van Looy et al. 2004; Perkmann et al. 2011b, 2013). Since industry pays for the 360 
research it has an interest in adopting the major research technologies (Wright et al., 2006). Also, 361 
firms aim at rapid commercialization and marketing an invention, because the benefits of 362 
innovation may depend on how quickly the product is adopted (Siegel et al. 2003, 2004). 363 
In transition countries, direct industrial funding takes place through various channels: 364 
outsourcing part of industry research to university scientists (full- or part-time employment); 365 
scientist’s employment at satellite firms of multinational companies (Zalewska-Kurek et al., 2016) 366 
or at headquarters and branches abroad; collaboration with industry scientists via guest talks, paid 367 
consulting, technology transfer, including transfer of special competences, access to special data, 368 
equipment and infrastructure, funds (Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009). 369 
Direct industrial funding of university research is preferred for scientist in a transition 370 
economy for the following reasons. First is commercialization income. Public grants are normally 371 
given to low-risk applied research under strict requirements and with public or university ownership 372 
of the research outcomes, while direct industrial funding provides additional commercialization 373 
income, access to industry financial and technical resources, infrastructure, scientists and data 374 
(Melin, 2000; Díez-Vial  and Montoro-Sánchez, 2016). Second is control. University ownership 375 
systems limits start-ups and spin-offs, as technology is publicly owned and its commercialization is 376 
limited (Damsgaard and Thursby, 2013). For example, if the research project is unsuccessful (if a 377 
new product does not start selling within three years of its invention), the research investment 378 
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should be returned to the public sponsor (Etalonline 2013). Unlike public funding, direct industrial 379 
funding has “negotiable” ownership systems on invention (e.g. scientists co-owns new technology). 380 
Third is flexibility. Direct industrial funding makes it easier to modify the research results if 381 
additional tasks or further adaptation is required (Bradley et al. 2013). This is unlikely with the 382 
public grants with limited budgets, strict deadlines on invention and dissemination periods. Fourth 383 
is networks. Direct industrial funding opens new possibilities for informal interactions, such as 384 
further consulting and collaborative research while further development of technology (Broadman 385 
and Ponomariov, 2009). Finally, it is co-ownership on invention. Commercialization agreement is 386 
signed between a private company and an inventor (inventor-ownership system) (Perkmann and 387 
Walsh, 2010; Hvide and Jones, 2016) and not between a private company and a TTO (university-388 
ownership system), when inventor may not be able to claim IP rights.. In the best possible contract 389 
with industry, an inventor will receive a share in royalty on gross revenues or profits.  390 
Political actions aimed at encouraging knowledge transfers using direct industrial funding 391 
have recently begun to develop further in transition economies (Bajmócy et al. 2010; Etalonline, 392 
2013). We hypothesize:  393 
H2: In transition economies direct industrial funding facilitates knowledge transfer from 394 
university. 395 
 396 
2.4. Context of transition countries  397 
We test our hypotheses using individual scientist data from three economies: Belarus, 398 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. They are rather peculiar, but representative transition economies. 399 
Belarus has a small, open economy and is one of the very few ‘soviet’-type countries left, which has 400 
recently embarked on significant market reforms and support to information technology sector. 401 
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are transition economies largely based on natural resources 402 
such as oil and gas. The economic and technological dynamics of these three economies depend to a 403 
significant extent on the absorption of new foreign technologies and knowledge (Marozau and 404 
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Guerrero, 2016). Multinational enterprises have started to be major actors in business R&D with 405 
developing linkages to university research. 406 
Since 1991, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have made greater efforts towards economic 407 
openness, trade and investment in new universities, adoption of effective mechanisms for research 408 
commercialization and market-based relations between research institutes, universities and 409 
enterprises (Yegorov, 2009). They have inherited a relatively well-developed science and 410 
technology system of the Soviet Union, however there is still a weak system of economic incentives 411 
and research commercialization (Radosevic, 1998).  412 
The economy of these countries is still significantly dominated by large public sector 413 
enterprises in machinery, agriculture, oil and gas. Although Belarus has remained much more 414 
‘Soviet’ than modern Russia, Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan, they are similar with regards to their 415 
academic cultures, methods of public support and control over their education and research sectors, 416 
government regulatory tools and control over industry and IP rights. Fewer universities compete 417 
internationally for publications and international students, with research budgets predominately 418 
spent on wages (Yegorov, 2009). Interestingly, unlike universities in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan,  419 
Belarusian universities that were established in the Soviet era have been preserved. 420 
Analysis of knowledge commercialization in these countries as post-Soviet transition 421 
economies has important implications, and is relevant to other transition economies in the former 422 
Soviet countries (Varblane et al. 2007b).  423 
Overall, the higher education sector is unattractive for young people due to low wages, lack of 424 
academic freedom and public (university) ownership on invention. Scientists struggle to 425 
commercialize their inventions via a traditional model of university knowledge transfer, aiming to 426 
get a part-time employment at multinational firm research labs and collaborate with their scientists. 427 
As in other transition countries such as Estonia (Mets, 2009), universities in Belarus, Azerbaijan 428 
and Kazakhstan have problems attracting internationally recognized scholars.  429 
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There are major differences between research commercialization in Belarus, Azerbaijan and 430 
Kazakhstan and in catching-up economies such as Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. The 431 
main difference is  their ability to learn “how  to…” and efficiently transfer technology to industry. 432 
Research commercialization models applied in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been tested in the 433 
“West” and have become a new emerging institutions (Varblane et al., 2007b). In Estonia, for 434 
example, research culture includes establishing and publishing in internationally peer-reviewed 435 
journals, grant applications, , performance-based distribution of public research funding (Mets, 436 
2009), which does not happen in Belarus, Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan.  IP protection and national 437 
innovation systems provide more incentives to knowledge transfer, for example in Estonia 438 
(Varblane et al. 2007b). Unlike in transition economies, many Estonian universities accepted “the 439 
entrepreneurial paradigm of the university in the triple helix of University- Industry-Government 440 
relations (Mets, 2006). This demonstrates that universities have begun to encourage the 441 
development of spin-off companies (Bray and Lee (2000) and to licence technologies to an 442 
entrepreneur (e.g. inventor or external partner) (Phan and Siegel, 2006).  443 
This is unlikely to happen at universities in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, as TTOs do 444 
not establish spin-offs and start-ups, rather they perform an information brokerage function between 445 
a university and investors  (Lerner, 2005). Collaboration with industry remains the preferred 446 
channel of knowledge transfer. Collaboration with other ecosystem stakeholders is limited. First, 447 
the government already funds research via national grants with public ownership on invention (not 448 
attractive to scientists). Second. angel and venture capital investment is limited in transition 449 
economies due to gaps in investor protection. In addition, most of university technologies are at 450 
early stage, increasing the risk and uncertainty on investment. Third, collaboration with non-for-451 
profit is negligible and is biased towards foreign grants and academic engagement such as 452 
volunteering work without technology transfer. Finally, scientists have little access to foreign 453 
universities and institutions outside their countries, including language barrier and lack of networks 454 
(Kenney and Patton, 2005). These are the reasons, why research commercialization by scientists in 455 
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transition economies lags behind their Western counterparts, and that alternative knowledge 456 
commercialization models are in place (Kerr and Nanda, 2009; Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009; 457 
Kwiek, 2012).  458 
Since existing innovation systems are still unable to link the knowledge creation to 459 
knowledge commercialization (Varblane et al.,  2007a, 2007b), the authorities made universities 460 
rather than scientists responsible for university knowledge transfer. Many universities responded on 461 
the call by establishing TTOs. This process was not fully thought through using the role models (Di 462 
Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Mustar et al., 2006; Chapple et al., 2005; Powers and McDougall, 2005; 463 
Grimaldi et al. 2011; Mosey et al., 2017), when knowledge transfer mechanisms are linked to 464 
scientist incentives (Kenney and Patton, 2009; Perkmann et al. 2011b, 2013) facilitating the 465 
individual mechanism of the knowledge spillover of entrepreneurship. Traditional universities in 466 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were reluctant to change their practices, and responded with 467 
the development of personal networks with practitioners and research authorities, building large 468 
public consortia for collaboration contracts. The model of multilevel interactions between 469 
ecosystem stakeholders, university and scientists (Figure 1) was largely ignored (Degroof and 470 
Roberts, 2004; Audretsch, 2014). Consequently, the majority of scientists have been unaware of 471 
how to commercialize their research via TTO, and what are the implications of research 472 
commercialization: where to find customers and what exactly can and cannot be commercialized?  473 
Several legal prosecutions of scientists who informally collaborated with industry have been 474 
broadcast in the media in the 2000s, which was not conducive to academic entrepreneurship in a 475 
region (Yegorov, 2009). The main obstacles remain an underdeveloped entrepreneurship ecosystem 476 
(Grimaldi et al. 2011; Leydesdorff et al. 2015; Theodoraki and Messeghem, 2017), a lack of 477 
economic incentives (Guerrero et al. 2014, 2016), and financial resources (Tchalakov et al., 2010). 478 
 479 
3. Methodology 480 
3.1. Data, sample selection issues and estimation strategy. 481 
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The empirical analysis is based on a novel cross-sectional dataset constructed via online 482 
survey over three years from November 2015 to August 2017 as the Academic entrepreneurship 483 
survey for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.  Participation in the survey was optional. The data 484 
collected in this study is the first attempt for generating statistics on university knowledge transfer 485 
in transition economies which are not collected by official statistics or by university scientists or 486 
TTOs. The online survey generated a comparatively small dataset that could be plagued by a non-487 
response bias or information disclosure bias. 488 
The data has been thoroughly reviewed by the authors. Unique features of the survey include 489 
sampling for representativeness at the level of regions in each country (at least one university in 490 
each country region and two leading universities in capital-city), university ownership (a balanced 491 
number of private/public universities), university size (medium and large) and field of study (at 492 
least 4 different faculties within each university) and scientist academic position (junior and senior 493 
scientists). The scientific disciplines include mathematics, physics, medicine, chemistry, 494 
engineering, agriculture, geosciences, economics and management, sports. The data was collected at 495 
20 universities in three transition countries: Belarus (8 out of 35 universities with approx. 40% of 496 
professors’ coverage), Kazakhstan (8 out of 61 universities with approx. 30% of professors’ 497 
coverage) and Azerbaijan (4 out of 28 universities with approx. 44% of professors’ coverage).1 498 
Table A1 in Appendix A provides a list of universities participated in the survey. These countries 499 
were selected building upon the societal clusters proposed by the Global Leadership and 500 
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness research program (GLOBE) that groups countries on the 501 
basis of cultural dimensions and similar institutions (Huyghe et al. 2016).  502 
                                                 
1 We do not have full data on a sample distribution by university as it was not a mandatory question in the survey. The data does not allow us to 
identify individuals as neither university name, department name nor university email were mandatory answers. Moreover most researchers and 
faculty members in the countries in focus have Google or email boxes external to the university. We see it as a way to enable greater confidentiality 
and avoid disclosure. In order to maintain confidentiality, we left university name and email optional in addition to giving a no-disclosure promise. 
Very few researchers provided university names, but were more collaborative on Google and email accounts. We thank one anonymous reviewer for 
drawing our attention to explaining this. 
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We started by collecting email and telephone information for the 4,705 established scientists 503 
via the universities’ web-pages by script with the help of the Phython programme. The records 504 
could generally be found by typing their full name, university and department. The ensuing e-mail 505 
accounts were then collected and registered in the scientist database. Of the 4,705 scientists 506 
identified and emailed, 2,602 responded. This means the initial response rate was 55.30 percent. 507 
Only a subsample of individual observations were defined as academically active, and provided 508 
information on commercialization income as a share of total income as well as other 509 
commercialization activity characteristics. As this might cause a selection bias, regressions based on 510 
such survey responses are commonly estimated using a two-stage approach (Heckman, 1979). In 511 
this, the subsequent second stage includes a control for unobserved determinants of selection 512 
estimated in the first stage (Crépon et al., 1998). Consequently, when an individual does not 513 
disclose income from commercialization it may mean they have an income, but do not wish to 514 
disclose it, or that they do not know their own income. It would be incorrect to exclude these 515 
observations, because the estimation of specific individuals may be biased by the fact that the 516 
individual is not properly identified by commercialization income. In the approach used here 517 
(Figure 2) both biases have to be accounted for. To address the disclosure bias we conducted a 518 
probit regression on all 2,602 individuals identified: 519 
 520 
Selection step one : 𝑃𝑟( 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 1 | 𝑥𝑖
1) = 𝛷(𝑥𝑖
1 𝛽)    (1) 521 
where 𝑥𝑖
1 contains the variables capturing scientist age, position (associate professor, full 522 
professor, researcher) and the type of commercialization activity a scientist is involved in (e.g. 523 
honorarium, establishing a spin-off,  licencing patents, product sales without spinoffs, public grants 524 
and spin-off establishment). We also include country and year fixed effects. Based on this 525 
regression, the Inverse Mill’s ratio was calculated. It is included in the final outcome regression to 526 
control for the disclosure of commercialization information selection bias, also known as 527 
independence bias (Herstad and Ebersberger, 2015). 528 
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By restricting this analysis to the 424 observations where the individuals all report 529 
commercialization income (positive or zero), it is possible to use the additional information 530 
available from the survey to estimate the likelihood of an individual to be active or not active in 531 
research commercialization. There is a group of scientists which are involved in at least one type of 532 
commercialization activity, but report no commercialization. For those observations we define a 533 
“commercialization active” bias. We conducted a probit regression on 424 individuals identified: 534 
 535 
Selection step two: 𝑃𝑟( 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 1 | 𝑥𝑖
2) = 𝛷(𝑥𝑖
2 𝛽)    (2) 536 
where 𝑥𝑖
2includes characteristics assumed to affect the decision to carry out 537 
commercialization activities, including country and year fixed effects. This includes researcher’s 538 
age, university ownership and the source of research financing (private, government, foreign, 539 
university or self-sponsorship) as well as type of external sponsor of research.  540 
Furthermore, financing research should positively influence the propensity to engage in 541 
current commercialization activity (Kerr and Nanda, 2009). University ownership (private vs. 542 
public) may also influence the decision to engage in research commercialization as well as 543 
scientist’s age (Crépon et al. 1998). Based on this selection regression a second Inverse Mill’s ratio 544 
was calculated which was included in the final outcome regression. The correction of two selection 545 
biases by means of the three-step model employed here requires two instruments to produce 546 
credible estimates. In each stage, at least one variable has to determine selection without affecting 547 
the final or subsequent stages (Heckman, 1979; Green, 2000). The results of the selection equations 548 
are reported in Table A2 in Appendix A.  549 
In Model 1 (Table A2), scientist age is measured as a natural logarithm as well as licencing 550 
patents. Professors and individuals involved in multiple forms of commercialization activity were 551 
found to be more likely to disclose their commercialization income.  552 
It is notable no significant impact was detected from other types of commercialization 553 
activities on disclosure bias. In Model 2 (Table A2), individuals whose research was financed by 554 
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foreign and government grants are more likely to be commercially active, while individuals who 555 
self-sponsored their research were less likely to be actively commercialising their research.  556 
In order to control for potential bias related to presence (or not) of TTO at university (not all 557 
universities had TTOs, see Table A1), we follow Green (2002) procedure to control for it. We 558 
include binary variable “TTO at university” which controls whether or not a TTO is established and 559 
continuous variable “TTO contracts” which illustrates a number of contracts signed via TTO in our 560 
empirical model. Once above variables are included the model will capture decision making on 561 
research commercialization by scientists located at universities with and without TTO. Our final 562 
sample of 272 researchers consisted of 38 researchers from Azerbaijan,  94 from Belarus and 140 563 
from Kazakhstan. 564 
 565 
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Figure 2: Estimation strategy 591 
In most instances, we set up response deadlines and asked university administrators (Deans, 592 
Head of Schools, departments and where applicable deputy vice-chancellors) for assistance to 593 
disseminate survey questionnaires to increase the response rate. The survey targeted both non-594 
tenured and tenured academic staff (Muscio, 2010; Cunningham and Link, 2015).  595 
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To support our quantitative approach we used a mixed-methods analysis which involved 596 
randomly selecting and face-to face interviewing scientists and TTO managers from the survey 597 
sample. We performed 27 face to face interviews (9 in Belarus, 14 in Kazakhstan and 4 in 598 
Azerbaijan) with university scientists and TTO managers during April 2016 - September 2017. 599 
Interviews were optional and strictly confidential. Appendix B1 describes the interview sample and 600 
Appendix B2 introduces the interview protocol and eligibility criteria for respondents.  601 
The average age of the respondents was 47.5 years, average experience of research and 602 
teaching 22 years, and average commercialization rate being 23 percent in the income. With regards 603 
to administrative position and university ownership, 66 percent of respondents were members of the 604 
faculty board, 55 percent worked in public universities and 45 percent worked in private 605 
universities. Interestingly, only 44 percent of respondents used TTO services or had signed a 606 
contract with TTO.  607 
A list of interviewees was created from the individuals who participated in a survey with and 608 
left their email willing to stay in touch. These were researchers, managers of business incubators, 609 
university technology transfer officers and professors. In addition, a snowball technique was used 610 
during the interviews. In this case, the respondents were asked to mention other researchers they 611 
knew to provide further opportunities to obtain data.  We delineated the population of respondents 612 
from these universities based on the following criteria. Firstly, the respondent needed to satisfy the 613 
condition of commercialising knowledge and technology created at the university. Secondly, the 614 
respondent had to be actively involved in various commercialization activities, with a share of 615 
commercialization in total income being positive. Further, the respondent needed to collaborate 616 
with at least one ecosystem stakeholder on research commercialization (e.g. university, government, 617 
private industry rather than self-sponsoring his(her) research).  618 
We identified scientists in both junior senior positions who were competent to comment, 619 
advise and suggest changes in research commercialization policy in these countries. They also 620 
advised us on mechanisms and loopholes in the IP rights and academic entrepreneurship ecosystem, 621 
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where scientists face significant challenges related to co-ownership of invention, engagement with 622 
TTOs, private industry, government and adoption of research outcomes. Interviewees has advised 623 
which areas needed to be targeted by foreign investors interested in commercializing research 624 
outcomes in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and economies-like. 625 
 626 
3.2 Variables  627 
To be included in a sample, all questions related to the variables of interest need to be 628 
completed with no missing values. All missing values and non-applicable answers were labelled as 629 
missing and therefore excluded from our sample. We proxy research commercialization activity 630 
with a share of scientist’s annual income from commercialization activities in total income, which is 631 
our dependent variable (Wright et al. 2007, 2009; Grimaldi et al. 2011; Siegel and Wright, 2015). 632 
The resulting dependent variable was further scaled on the interval [0,1] with the average of 0.14 633 
(14% of annual income from commercialization activity), the lowest share equal zero and the 634 
highest share of commercialization equals 0.90 which is 90% of annual income coming from 635 
research commercialization. We applied a multi-level approach (Grimaldi et al., 2011; Guerrero and 636 
Urbano, 2013; Miller et al. 2014; Theodoraki and Messeghem, 2017) to the process of research 637 
commercialization with variables at ecosystem level, university (organizational level), and scientist 638 
(individual level).  639 
Our individual level control variables (CVs) build on Wright et al. (2007), Boardman and 640 
Ponomariov (2009), Aldridge and Audretsch (2011), Grimaldi et al., (2011), Guerrero and Urbano 641 
(2013) and Banal-Estañol et al. (2015) include: researcher’s professional and personal 642 
characteristics, such as number of works published in the last 5 years; academic position at the 643 
university; share of research in total workload; self-sponsorship of research (if any). Individual level 644 
has one explanatory variable (EV) which is individual’s TTO awareness at university. TTO 645 
awareness may reflect the scientist’s level of engagement in commercialization. A positive 646 
relationship suggests that TTO awareness would increase research commercialization. 647 
 26 
Our organizational level CV is university ownership (Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011; Clarysse 648 
et al. 2011), which takes a value of one for scientists employed at public universities and zero 649 
otherwise. Because they are at least partially financed by the government, public universities are 650 
limited in appropriation of IP rights on university research results. For example in Belarus, this has 651 
only become possible with adoption of the ‘Belarusian Bayh-Dole act’ (Etalonline 2013).  652 
Organizational level has two EVs. First is binary variable equals one if TTO is established at 653 
university. Second is the number of  contracts signed between a TTO and a scientist, which is a 654 
university-level variable. Drawing on Wright et al. (2007, 2008, 2009), Banal-Estanol et al. (2015) 655 
and MIT REAP framework (2017) ecosystem level CVs includes direct funding  of research by 656 
ecosystem stakeholders such as government, industry, risk capital, foreign firms, non-for-profit 657 
(NGO) (Siegel et al. 2004; Bradley et al. 2013).  658 
We followed Thursby and Thursby (2004), Grimaldi et al. (2011); Miller et al. (2014),  as 659 
well as  Theodoraki and Messeghem (2017) by asking researchers if they collaborated in their 660 
research with any of ecosystem stakeholders (such as industry and professional associations, foreign 661 
industry or academia, public institutions or government, non-for-profit or universities).2 Ecosystem 662 
level has one binary EV - direct industrial funding. Our model includes country and year fixed 663 
effects. Table 2 illustrates the list of variables at the individual, university and ecosystem levels. 664 
These are to be used as explanatory and control variables to test our research hypotheses. Table 3 665 
illustrates a correlation matrix of variables used in our final sample.  666 
 667 
 668 
 669 
                                                 
2 As part of the ecosystem we also controlled for the following variables at country level: GDP per capita and population size (millions) from the World 
Bank development indicators; Global innovation index from the Global innovation index report; patent applications by residents and non-residents 
per 100,000 residents from the World Bank data and Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International. We used two-year lagged 
values for these variables to address the issue of endogeneity. Inclusion of these country controls has not changed the coefficient signs, confidence 
intervals or significance level in our the estimation model (3) . Neither has it improved the model specification and goodness of fit, as all 
macroeconomic indicators were not statistically significant. This means that changes in the entrepreneurship ecosystem related to socioeconomic 
conditions, innovation and informal institutions do not change the degree of research commercialization by scientist. Our country dummies, which 
control for country fixed effects, were not statistically significant. We thus decided to keep country controls using the fixed effect approach (Green, 
2002). We thank one anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this. 
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Table 2: Description of dependent, independent and control variables. 670 
Variables Variable description Mean St. dev Min Max 
Individual characteristics 
Commercialization 
share (DV) 
Share of income, funds coming from commercializing 
research, % (on scale from zero to one) 
0.14 0.18 0.00 0.90 
Published works 
 
Number of works published in the last 5 years 23.12 16.76 0.00 60.00 
Researcher 
 
Research fellow position equals one, zero otherwise 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Ass. Professor 
 
Associate Professor position equals one, zero otherwise 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Research in workload Share of research in total work 1-(0-25%) to 4 (75-100%) 1.73 0.81 1.00 4.00 
Self-sponsor 
 
Research is self-financed equals one, zero otherwise 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
TTO awareness 
Researcher is aware of a TTO established at university equals 
one, zero otherwise 
0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
University characteristics 
TTO contracts Number of contracts signed via TTO 0.46 1.41 0.00 8.00 
TTO at  university 
 
TTO is established at university , zero otherwise 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Private university 
 
Private university equals one,  zero otherwise 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Environmental  characteristics 
University sponsor 
 
Research is financed by university equals one, zero otherwise 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Industrial funding 
Direct industrial funding of research and technologies) equals 
one, zero otherwise 
0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Foreign  
External stakeholder: foreign institutions (industry and 
academia) equals one, zero otherwise 
0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Industry 
External stakeholder: industry and professional associations 
equals one, zero otherwise 
0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
University 
External stakeholder: other academic institutions equals one, 
zero otherwise 
0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
NGO External stakeholder: NGOs equals one, zero otherwise 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Public  
External stakeholder: public institutions or government 
equals one, zero otherwise 
0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Lambda 1 The inverted Mills ratio for disclosure bias 1.58 0.43 0.76 2.85 
Lambda 2 The inverted  Mills ratio for commercialization active bias 0.27 0.16 0.01 0.60 
Note: Number of researchers in final sample: 272.  671 
Source: Academic entrepreneurship survey data for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (collected 2015, 2016 and 2017).672 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Commercialization share 1             
2 Published works -0.01 1            
3 Researcher 0.08 -0.18* 1           
4 Ass. Professor -0.03 0.15* -0.29* 1          
5 Research in workload 0.10 0.18* 0.16* -0.06 1         
6 TTO contracts 0.05 -0.01 0.27* 0.02 0.11 1        
7 TTO awareness 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.40* 1       
8 TTO at  university 0.07 0.03 0.16* 0.01 0.02 0.24* 0.53* 1      
9 Private university -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 1     
10 University sponsor -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.13* 0.01 0.02 0.01 1    
11 Industrial funding 0.26* -0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.11* 1   
12 Self-sponsor -0.12* -0.17* -0.17* 0.13* -0.10 -0.04 -0.14* -0.12* 0.21* -0.06 -0.07 1  
13 Lambda 1 0.12* 0.02 -0.06 0.13* 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.11 0.17* -0.01 1 
14 Lambda 2 -0.13* -0.19* -0.07 0.05 -0.14* -0.08 -0.13* -0.08 -0.10 0.17* -0.18* 0.56* -0.12* 
Note: Number of scientists: 272. * - 5% statistical significance level of the coefficient. Correlation coefficient are not presented for a set of dummies on collaboration with external 
stakeholders (industry, foreign institutions, public institutions, NGO and university) to safe space.  
Source: Academic entrepreneurship survey data for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (collected 2015, 2016, 2017) 
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3.3. Estimation method.  590 
We started our analysis by applying a multilevel generalized linear model to estimate a 591 
fractional dependent variable. This was based on reports from individuals observed in the three 592 
consecutive waves for Belarus and Kazakhstan, and one wave for Azerbaijan. The sample is 593 
rotated, which means that individuals from one wave cannot be tracked in another, and the 594 
estimations through a pooled estimation makes distinguishing between temporal or sampling effects 595 
unfeasible. The selection of a multilevel estimation approach was based on the model introduced in 596 
Figure 1 with the variables describing individual, university (organizational) and ecosystem 597 
characteristics which affect the likelihood of research commercialization.  598 
In a multilevel estimation, sometimes also called a hierarchical, random coefficient was not 599 
statistically significant. The data structure in the population was thus not identified as hierarchical 600 
(Goldstein, 2011). In other words, a multilevel generalized linear model was not feasible 601 
(Goldstein, 2011). This means that neither variation in university characteristics (specification 2 and 602 
3 and 5 and 6, Table A3) nor variation in country characteristics (specification 1 and 4, Table A3) in 603 
each survey wave shaped research commercialization (Maas and Hox, 2005). Table A3 offers a 604 
robustness check of the multilevel estimation with the distribution of dependent variables 605 
(commercialization share) as  binomial (specifications 1-3, Table A3) and Bernoulli (specifications 606 
4-6, Table A3). Bearing in mind the issues pointed out by Baum (2008) when modelling 607 
proportions as dependent variables, we estimated the generalised logistic model with three-level 608 
controls and the fractional dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 defined on the interval [0,1] such that: 609 
 𝑔[𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘)] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝛽2𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽3𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘     (3) 610 
where i is the individual at university j and country k. The explanatory variables  are 611 
presented by 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 , control variables  are presented by 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘 and the Inverse Mill’s ratio for disclosure 612 
and commercialization activity bias is   𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑘 as described in Crépon et al. (1998). We followed the 613 
Heckman (1979) approach to compute two Inverse Mill’s ratios (𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑘) from the equations (1) and 614 
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(2) and including them our final model (3) to control for selection bias.  The presence and direction 615 
of a selection bias was inferred from the statistical significance and sign of the Mill’s ratio 616 
coefficients in equation (3). Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 is an error term. Equation (3) includes year and country 617 
fixed effects. 618 
 619 
4. Results 620 
4.1. TTO and university research commercialization 621 
Table 4 provides the results of our model (3). Neither the establishment of the technology 622 
transfer office nor the number of contracts established via the TTO nor TTO awareness had a 623 
statistically significant impact on the commercialization share of scientist income, supporting H1 624 
(Table 4, spec. 1-3). The coefficient of TTO awareness (β=0.605; p<0.12) is positive, but 625 
statistically insignificant at a 10% level (Table 4, specification 3). Predictive Margins with 95% 626 
confidence intervals (CIs) in Fig.3 illustrate a similar level of commercialization share for scientists 627 
at universities with and without a TTO. Predictive Margins with 95% CIs in Fig.4 illustrate a 628 
similar level of commercialization share for scientists having different number of 629 
commercialization contracts with TTO. For example, scientists who have one or ten contracts with 630 
TTO are likely to have a  similar level of commercialization income. Predictive Margins with 95% 631 
CIs in Fig.5 illustrate that who were aware or unaware of TTOs existence at university  have a 632 
similar level of commercialization income.  633 
Table 4: Generalised logistic model estimation with three-level controls  634 
Model specification (1) (2) (3) 
Individual characteristics 
Published works 
0.009 
(0.01) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
0.008 
(0.01) 
Researcher 
0.312 
(0.56) 
0.281 
(0.56) 
0.356 
(0.56) 
Ass. Professor 
0.626* 
(0.35) 
0.609* 
(0.35) 
0.625* 
(0.36) 
Research in workload 
-0.342* 
(0.19) 
-0.358* 
(0.19) 
-0.363* 
(0.20) 
Self-sponsor 
-0.599 
(0.47) 
-0.645 
(0.46) 
-0.601 
(0.47) 
TTO awareness (H1) 
 
 
 
 
0.605 
(0.36) 
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University characteristics 
TTO at University (H1) 
0.413 
(0.32) 
 
 
 
 
TTO contracts (H1) 
 
 
0.152 
(0.15) 
 
 
Private university 
-0.213 
(0.44) 
-0.185 
(0.44) 
-0.178 
(0.44) 
Environmental characteristics 
University sponsor 
-0.251 
(0.39) 
-0.191 
(0.39) 
-0.253 
(0.39) 
Industrial funding (H2) 
1.778** 
(0.91) 
1.782** 
(0.91) 
1.764** 
(0.90) 
Foreign  
-0.07 
(0.50) 
-0.05 
(0.51) 
-0.06 
(0.51) 
Industry 
-0.03 
(0.54) 
-0.01 
(0.54) 
-0.04 
(0.55) 
University 
0.26 
(0.47) 
0.29 
(0.47) 
0.32 
(0.48) 
NGO 
1.46** 
(0.71) 
1.47** 
(0.71) 
1.50** 
(0.72) 
Public  
0.52 
(0.48) 
0.48 
(0.48) 
0.51 
(0.49) 
The inverse Mills ratio for disclosure bias 
-0.651* 
(0.37) 
-0.658* 
(0.37) 
-0.663* 
(0.37) 
The inverse Mills ratio for commercialization  
active bias 
-2.534* 
(1.49) 
-2.614* 
(1.49) 
-2.467* 
(1.49) 
country = Belarus 
0.910 
(0.56) 
0.986 
(0.56) 
0.953 
(0.57) 
country =  Kazakhstan 
0.095 
(0.51) 
0.180 
(0.51) 
0.088 
(0.52) 
Year 2016 
0.862 
(0.71) 
0.941 
(0.71) 
0.933 
(0.71) 
Year 2017 
1.185* 
(0.66) 
1.305** 
(0.66) 
1.253* 
(0.65) 
Constant 
1.703* 
(0.99) 
1.796* 
(0.98) 
1.758* 
(0.98) 
Number of obs. 272 272 272 
LR chi2 41.16 40.73 42.45 
Log-likelihood -130.13 -130.35 -129.49 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.14 
Note: Number of scientists: 272. Reference year=2015; Reference country=Azerbaijan. . ***, ** and * Significance at 635 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  636 
Source: Academic entrepreneurship survey data for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (2015, 2016, 2017) 637 
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 638 
Figure 3: Predictive Margins with 95% CIs: Expected commercialization rate and TTO 639 
establishment at university 640 
 641 
 642 
Figure 4: Predictive Margins with 95% CIs: Expected commercialization rate and number of 643 
contracts established via TTO  644 
 645 
 646 
Figure 5: Predictive Margins with 95% CIs: Expected commercialization rate and TTO  awareness 647 
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The mixed method approach and 27 face-to-face interviews with TTO managers and scientists 648 
were helpful in shedding more light on the role of TTOs in university knowledge transfer. 649 
Interviewee four (I4) commented, “One of the reasons TTOs are not able to help scholars is the 650 
institutional framework which is unfriendly in transition countries” confirming Yegorov (2009). 651 
I(4) further laments: “TTOs in Belarus have highly bureaucratized rules and practices and lack 652 
expert knowledge, and make it expensive to register contracts and run grants”, supporting Link’s et 653 
al. (2007) findings. (I1) stated that, “TTOs are becoming university departments that process 654 
documents for public funding and grants, and collect substantial shares of financing performing an 655 
information broker to government, university and scientists, but not to investors (Lerner, 2005). (I5) 656 
adds: “TTO for me equals bureaucracy” (Marozau and Guerrero, 2016). (I7) defended the 657 
importance of TTOs at universities, but stated: “You need a person who collaborates with people in 658 
the industry and with scientists. But such person is likely to be from a similar background that a 659 
researcher to understand how a product works. An entrepreneur definitely needs to be an expert in 660 
the product they manufacture. Companies that innovate need people even in marketing and other 661 
areas who have PhDs in Physics, or in a very narrow specific field to understand it”(Lockett and 662 
Wright, 2005; Berman, 2008). Hiring a competent TTO leader in transition economies is clearly an 663 
issue (Wright et al., 2008). 664 
In Azerbaijan the situation with TTOs is concerning. As (I27) commented, “Current state 665 
legislation does not even allow universities or research institutions to use international grant funds. 666 
In addition, one of the most challenging is the gap in the vision of top management with university 667 
departments as well as departments such as TTOs”. This raises the importance of Kenney and 668 
Patton’s (2009) and Grimaldi’s et al. (2011) argument regarding the creation of a regulation to 669 
allow commercialization. Even though there are a number of highly-qualified researchers and 670 
human resources at universities, the lack of understanding and vision of the top management 671 
prevents successful research commercialization.  672 
(I11) further adds to the efficiency of TTOs in transition economies: “Absolutely no 673 
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competence at TTO. They do not have experience of working in business or industry. No market 674 
intuition, innovative ideas or knowledge of how to commercialize technology” (Link et al. 2007; 675 
Wright et al., 2008; Kolympiris and Klein, 2017). Regarding the new generation of TTOs, (I21) 676 
adds: “We are the Bekturov Institute of Chemical Sciences in Kazakhstan and commercialize 677 
medical chemistry research, development of new to market drugs, with enormous barriers of 678 
commercialization in medical practice: no links with pharma private businesses, public and private 679 
sponsorship of medical product trials is very low, which directly affects the willingness and interest 680 
of medical graduates to work in the field of medical chemistry”. (I2) also laments: “TTOs are 681 
bureaucrats with [the] decision-making process depending on top university officials and 682 
government priorities, not necessarily on what business needs. As a researcher I will go where [the] 683 
money [is] when commercializing my research, private business is much of a help”. This 684 
demonstrates the importance of co-ownership on invention and direct collaboration with industry 685 
(Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009)  686 
Scientists reflecting on TTOs bureaucracy and inefficiencies have called for a new generation 687 
of TTOs which can develop a practice-based mix of offerings and to become an information broker 688 
for potential investors (Lerner, 2005) 689 
(I10) highlights the role of cultural factors, which could not be captured easily captured with 690 
the regression model, such as the use of English language in transition economies to communicate 691 
to foreigner investors and entrepreneurs. I(20) from Kazakhstan adds on the lack of networking 692 
between university and business: “I have worked with a number of business schools, let’s put it like 693 
that. I’ve been totally underwhelmed at what I’ve seen. I’ve been going to them to market my 694 
research and because I wanted a business community. The truth is most businesses know more than 695 
most business schools”. 696 
 697 
4.2. Direct industrial funding and university research commercialization 698 
Direct industrial funding facilitates knowledge commercialization by scientists (Bogler, 1994; 699 
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van Looy et al. 2004; Bozeman and Gaaughan 2007).(spec 1-3, Table 4). Fig. 6 illustrates the 700 
expected value of research commercialization income under direct industrial funding (private 701 
industry).  702 
 703 
Figure 6: Predictive Margins with 95% CIs: Expected commercialization rate and direct industrial 704 
funding. 705 
 706 
Scientists who reported their external commercialization partner as industry have significantly 707 
higher level of commercialization income, supporting H2. Our findings also supports Kerr and 708 
Nanda (2009) and Aldridge and Audretsch (2011) for developed countries, when the lack of 709 
industrial funding constrains academic entrepreneurship. 710 
Our interview results demonstrate that researchers do not consider TTOs to be helpful, and 711 
aim to bypass TTOs altogether by directly approaching industry direct (Link et al., 2007; Bozeman 712 
and Gaughan, 2007). (I10) stated: “I used to be very well connected to industry in Venezuela and 713 
with a few in the US, but here it has been really difficult to approach “the industry” to offer 714 
partnership due to the difficulty of communicating in English in much of the power and energy 715 
sector, which is my main area…I could, however, connect with foreign industries working in 716 
Kazakhstan, interested to adopt technology, but I have noticed they were only interested in 717 
providing services”. TTOs at university should perform a stronger broker role for investors in 718 
marketing invention (Siegel et al. 2004; Cunningham and Link 2015; O’Kane et al. (2015). As 719 
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suggested by I(20): “there are commercialization challenges with private industry in Kazakhstan. In 720 
my opinion, the level of collaboration between science and industry is at its lowest, and in particular 721 
in business and economics”. This is puzzling as while university business schools are not engaged 722 
in applied research, they could become facilitators of market development and compliment TTOs 723 
(Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011; Audretsch, 2014). Several interviewees commented on direct 724 
industrial funding in Belarus. (I2) comments: “It is hard to connect to industry if you do not have 725 
networks, however those who manage may directly own the invention or share the ownership 726 
between a sponsor – private industry and a scientists”. (I2) further adds “Direct industrial funding is 727 
more attractive here as it is faster, they are open and give more freedom of research and 728 
experimentation, they involve you at each step of commercialization and pay royalty” (Melin, 2000; 729 
Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004; Damsgaard and Thursby, 2013). Our interviews confirm that 730 
scientists support the “Professor Privilege” –type system (Hvide and Jones, 2016) and wish it to be 731 
adopted in transition economies.  732 
 733 
4.3. Other factors and university research commercialization 734 
At the individual level of university knowledge transfer model,  prioritizing research over 735 
teaching and commercialization results in a lower commercialization income (β=-0.342-0.363; 736 
p<0.10) , while being an associate professor increases commercialization income (β=0.609-0.626; 737 
p<0.05) (Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011). Neither self-sponsoring research nor publication record is 738 
associated with research commercialization income, which contrast negative association found by 739 
Broadman and Ponomariov (2009). High number of publications may not necessarily correspond to 740 
high-quality research in a transition context as most of publications target national and not 741 
international peer-reviewed journals.  742 
At the organizational level, university ownership is not associated with research 743 
commercialization  income. At the ecosystem level, university funding research does not change 744 
research commercialization income. Research funding by public institutions, foreign institutions 745 
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and professional associations as well as academic partner institutions (outside the university) is not 746 
associated with research commercialization income. Collaboration with non-for-profits increases 747 
commercialization income (β=1.46-1.50; p<0.05), however, this type of collaboration usually 748 
includes paid consultancy and volunteering work, and is not associated with technology transfer to 749 
non-for-profit (Bercovitz et al. 2001).   .  750 
Ecosystem-level formal and informal institutions in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were 751 
similar to each other in their impact on research commercialization income of scientists. An average 752 
scientist’s commercialization income in 2017 was higher than in 2015. Inverse Mill’s ratios for 753 
disclosure bias and commercialization active are negative and statistically significant. This 754 
demonstrates that respondents who did not answer the question on commercialization and were not 755 
included in our final sample were less likely to participate in commercialization activity and receive 756 
an income.  757 
 758 
5. Discussion. 759 
Unlike factors which influence research commercialization in developed economies (Chapple 760 
et al., 2005; Mustar et al., 2006; Grimaldi et al., 2011; Heinzl et al. 2013; Bradley et al. 2013) 761 
forged through social capital measures and experience gained by serving on an advisory board, in 762 
the transition context they do not seem to play an important role. At the same time aspects of human 763 
capital such as academic position as well as  personal characteristics of scientists such as age, 764 
publication record  have little or no effect on commercialization income, either in the US (Aldridge 765 
and Audretsch, 2011) or in transition countries.  766 
According to the existing literature (Thursby and Thursby, 2004; Perkmann et al. 2013; 767 
Guerrero and Urbano, 2014, 2017) and in case of the troubled transition economies (Marozau and 768 
Guerrero, 2016), we found that the universities’ TTOs are limited in their legal and resource ability 769 
to commercialize university research (Perkmann et al. 2013). Scientists at universities often treat 770 
invention as a “public good” (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004), hence the detect involvement of a 771 
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scientist in a start-up or spin-off is unlikely. In contrast, private industry funds research it has 772 
already identified to have high potential for commercialization. Since private industry pays for the 773 
research it has an interest in adopting it as well as maintaining the legal ownership of research 774 
outcomes (Broadman and Ponomariov, 2009). U 775 
Our finding demonstrates that direct industrial funding is the most efficient route of research 776 
commercialization by scientists as compared to disclosure, marketing and adaptation of technology 777 
via TTOs. We contend that TTO activity and direct industrial funding are not two successive steps, 778 
but may perform as two alternative models of knowledge transfer . This is an unexpected and 779 
interesting finding, which emphasizes the role of inventor-ownership on research outcomes in 780 
transition economies. The implementation of inventor-ownership mechanism in transition 781 
economies is challenging. This will require legal changes (e.g. IP regulation, co-ownership), 782 
creating university environment which is supportive to entrepreneurial activities (e.g. adjustment in 783 
teaching load, academic leadership and citizenship, funding conferences, academic visits, guest 784 
lectures, applied research and dissemination activities) (Kenney and Goe, 2004), in particular, TTOs 785 
should be granted greater independence from university and their leaders to be given more 786 
economic incentives  to become a conduit of knowledge transfer.  787 
To date, TTOs have become neither facilitators nor promoters of knowledge transfer and 788 
knowledge spillover from universities. This challenges the legitimacy of TTOs (O’Kane et al., 789 
2015) as centres of knowledge transfer. Kenney and Patton (2009) found the system under which 790 
universities maintain the legal ownership of inventions is less than optimal in terms of economic 791 
efficiency and in advancing the private interests of commercialization. Our finding confirms it for 792 
transition economies.  793 
We propose three alternatives that would address the current lack of scientists’ engagement in 794 
research commercialization in transition contexts.  795 
Our first proposal is to vest ownership with the inventor in a spirit of the “Professor Privilege” 796 
system. Investors should be free to contract with the university TTO or any other entity outside the 797 
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university to support research commercialization. Inventor-ownership system was suggested by 798 
Kenney and Patton (2009) and in recent works by Czarnitzki et al (2015, 2016) who found that 799 
transition from an inventor-ownership to a university-ownership model decreased both the volume 800 
and quality of patented inventions by university professors. Hvide and Jones (2016) found that the 801 
abolishment of” Professor's Privilege” in Norway led to about a 50% drop in the rate of start-ups by 802 
university researchers. Policy makers who presumed that costs and risks of patenting and starting a 803 
business were too high for individual inventors appeared to be wrong.  804 
Our second proposal is to sponsor open access to university research through public funds, 805 
without an exclusive right of a public sponsor, or a university, on research results in any sector and 806 
any university type. All inventions will be further contracted by the TTO if the establishment of a 807 
legal relationship to further expand and validate the inventions is required by industry. It is also 808 
important that all inventions should be licensed freely and non-exclusively. Unless sponsored 809 
directly by private industry, neither universities TTO nor other public sponsor may hold exclusive 810 
ownership of inventions (Powers and McDougall, 2005; Audretsch, 2014; Shu et al. 2014).  811 
Our third proposal is to support TTO’s brokerage between junior university scientists and 812 
industry (Perkmann et al., 2013). Junior scientists have less experience in marketing technology to 813 
private industry and work with early stage technologies may benefit most by disclosing their 814 
inventions to TTOs as the earlier stage of technology development (Lerner, 2005).  815 
Interviewee (I20) contributed to this discussion: “We need a commercialization platform to 816 
engage researchers right through the university to industry. This is private industry which needs to 817 
dictate [to] TTOs what problems need to be solved and what would they like to improve”. These 818 
measures  will enhance participation of ecosystem stakeholders and TTOs in knowledge transfer. 819 
Various crowdfunding platforms and angel investor funds have been established in collaboration 820 
with the business schools in developed economies (Guerrero and Urbano, 2012, 2014; Belitski and 821 
Heron, 2017). If current structures cannot be created with the current competences on the basis of 822 
TTOs in transition economies, scientists, in particular more mature and with late-stage technologies 823 
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will continue to bypass TTOs (Link et al., 2007). A new generation of TTOs should be integrated 824 
within business schools structures with private ownership on invention in case of successful 825 
fundraising . Finally, the effect of university support mechanisms should be more decisive (Kenney 826 
and Goe, 2004; Kwiek, 2012). “What makes a die-hard academic entrepreneur?” with 15  years 827 
overview of the academic entrepreneurship and knowledge transfer literature, the answer is very 828 
different to scientist entrepreneurs in transition economies. 829 
 830 
6. Conclusions. 831 
By asking scientists rather than university TTOs (Caldera and Debande, 2010) about the 832 
entrepreneurial activities they engage in and their commercialization income, a clear picture 833 
emerges  for the research commercialization in transition economies. Firstly, a number of 834 
indications suggest that there is no relationship between the establishment of TTOs, TTO 835 
awareness, the number of contracts signed via a TTO and the extent of research commercialization. 836 
The former is not associated with individual characteristics such as scientist age, research output 837 
and quality or the self-sponsorship of research. Secondly, direct industrial funding is an effective 838 
conduit of knowledge transfer and knowledge spillover from universities , which may function as a 839 
substitute for public and angel finances. It is important that ownership is shared between an inventor 840 
and industry. Thirdly, the extent of research commercialization is less organisationally embedded 841 
and more ecosystem embedded with direct industrial funding plays the leading role in research 842 
commercialization (Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009; Grimaldi et al., 2011; Miller et al. 2014; Acs 843 
et al. 2017).  844 
The empirical results from this study also suggest that more scientists engage in research 845 
commercialization in transition economies than in the US (Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011); 846 
however, only 13 percent of them are paid for knowledge transfers. This study makes the following 847 
contributions to academic entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship ecosystems and the KSTE literatures.  848 
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First, adopting the TTO perspective of the KSTE and the stakeholder perspective to 849 
entrepreneurship ecosystem framework, we investigate research commercialization by scientists in 850 
transition economies controlling for individual, university and ecosystem characteristics. The 851 
empirical results suggest, that commercialization income does not exactly mirror what has been 852 
found in the literature on academic entrepreneurship in developed economies (Wright et al., 2006, 853 
2007; Kenney and Patton, 2005, 2009; Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011; Perkmann et al., 2011a, 854 
2013).  855 
Secondly, we develop a multi-level model of university research commercialization , which 856 
jointly examined the role of TTOs  and direct industrial funding capital as a conduit of knowledge 857 
transfer from university in transition countries.  858 
Thirdly, using unique primary data on scientists’ entrepreneurial activity in three transition 859 
economies and controlling for various selection biases, this study provides important evidence for 860 
users / investors of academic research in transition economies. We demonstrate that university 861 
TTO, unlike direct industrial funding, has not yet become a conduit for knowledge transfer and 862 
spillover (Audretsch, 2014).  863 
Responding to a call in the academic entrepreneurship literature (Kenney and Patton, 2009; 864 
Grimaldi et al. 2011; Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011), this study identifies the determinants of 865 
university research commercialization across a broad spectrum of scientific fields, sizes, types of 866 
universities and in a different socioeconomic context. Whether this finding holds across broader 867 
groups of developing and transition economies as well as across more specific scientific fields and 868 
ecosystem stakeholders is an important issue that will be addressed in future research.  869 
Subsequent research needs to identify the prevalence and multi-level determinants (Perkmann 870 
et al. 2013; Guerrero and Urbano, 2013) of a variety of research commercialization models, such as 871 
establishing a spin-off, corporate entrepreneurship, paid consultancy and other (Muscio, 2010; 872 
Siegel et al. 2007; Kenney and Patton 2009; Abreu et al. 2016; Kolympiris and Klein, 2017). What 873 
particular organizational and ecosystem characteristics as well as scientist’s capabilities that 874 
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facilitate interactions with the industry, foreign firms, government and TTOs? Given a very limited 875 
functions of TTOs in transition economies, it is unlikely we can expect any substantial effect of 876 
TTO activity on the valorization of research results. Implementation of the multi-level academic 877 
entrepreneurship ecosystem framework in future research (Perkmann et al. 2013; Acs et al. 2017) 878 
could be an answer to how research commercialization could be better facilitated by a variety of 879 
entrepreneurial ecosystem actors.  It is also important to find an entrepreneurship ecosystem locus 880 
(city, region, country) with characteristics which are strongly associated with scientists’ decision-881 
making to commercialize research.  882 
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Appendix A 1151 
 1152 
Table A1: The list of universities participated in the survey and interviews 1153 
 1154 
Country Institution 
Webometrics 
ranking of 
University 
Pre-1991 
University 
Technical 
University 
TTO 
established 
 
 
 
Belarus 
 
 
 
 
Belarusian State University 1 Yes No Yes 
Belarusian State Economic University 9 Yes No No 
Belarusian National Technical University 2 Yes Yes Yes 
Belarusian State University of Informatics 
and Radioelectronics 
5 Yes Yes Yes 
Polessky State University 11 No No No 
Polotsk State University 16 Yes Yes No 
Belarusian State Technological University 6 Yes Yes Yes 
Belarusian State Agricultural Academy 30 Yes No No 
Kazakhstan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nazarbayev University 5 Yes Yes Yes 
Kazakh-British Technical University 11 Yes Yes Yes 
KIMEP University 9 No No Yes 
Kazakh National Technical University 3 Yes Yes Yes 
Narhoz University 9 Yes No Yes 
Turan University 54 No No No 
Akhmet Yassawi International Kazak-
Turkish university 
n/a No No Yes 
Innovative Eurasian University 35 No No Yes 
 
Azerbaijan 
 
 
Baku State University 1 Yes Yes Yes 
Azerbaijan University of Architecture and 
Construction 
13 Yes Yes No 
Baku Engineering University 5 No Yes Yes 
Khazar University 3 No No No 
Source: Webometrics Ranking of World Universities available at: http://www.webometrics.info/en/ and 1155 
university website  information. 1156 
 1157 
  1158 
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Table A2: Selection models. 1159 
Two-step Heckman approach 
  
Model 1: Disclosure=1 Model 2: Active=1 
dx/dy SE 
Marginal 
effects 
dx/dy SE 
Marginal 
effects 
Age (log) 1.01 0.38*** 3.71 0.26 0.29 3.71 
Researcher=1, 0 otherwise 0.24 0.25 0.14       
Ass. Professor=1, 0 otherwise -0.34 0.21* 0.35       
Full professor=1, 0 otherwise -0.16 0.30 0.18       
Comm. activity: consulting=1, 0 otherwise -0.03 0.22 0.19       
Comm. activity: honorarium=1, 0 otherwise 0.28 0.19 0.33       
Comm. activity: establishing spin-off=1, 0 otherwise -0.49 0.41 0.08       
Comm. activity: licencing patents=1, 0 otherwise 0.57 0.37* 0.06       
Comm. activity:  product sales=1, 0 otherwise -0.17 0.24 0.18       
Comm. activity: public grants=1, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.18 0.53       
Comm. activity: multiple=1, 0 otherwise -1.09 0.22*** 0.43       
Research financed by university=1, 0 otherwise       -0.19 0.21 0.18 
Research financed by foreign grants=1, 0 otherwise       0.89 0.34** 0.13 
Research financed by government grants =1, 0 otherwise       0.39 0.20** 0.34 
Research financed by private industry=1, 0 otherwise       0.27 0.34 0.08 
Research self-financed=1, 0 otherwise        -0.35 0.19* 0.35 
 Private university=1, 0 otherwise       0.27 0.19 0.24 
Country dummies (reference country=Azerbaijan) 
Year dummies (reference year=2005) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Number of obs. 
Likelihood ratio test Wald chi2 
Prob > Chi2 
Pseudo-R2 
2602 
47.5 
0.00 
0.126 
424 
36.28 
0.00 
0.100 
Note: Marginal effects and robust standard errors from probit regression model are shown. ***, ** and * Significance at the 1%, 5% and 1160 
10% levels, respectively. Both models include year controls, which are jointly significant. Model 1 and Model 2 the inverse Mills ratios 1161 
calculated are used on the final stage to predict commercialization share. Reference category for commercialization activity=multiple 1162 
commercialization activity. Reference category for commercialization activity=multiple commercialization activity. Reference category for 1163 
research financing= multiple sources of finance. 1164 
Source: Academic entrepreneurship survey data for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (collected 2015, 2016 and 2017). 1165 
 1166 
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Table A3: Mixed-effects GLM: Country and university level effects on scientist’s research 1168 
commercialization activity. DV: Commercialization share in income standardized [0,1] 1169 
 1170 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. variable distribution Binomial Bernoulli 
Constant 
1.149*** 
(0.21) 
1.167*** 
(0.16) 
1.167*** 
(0.16) 
1.169*** 
(0.17) 
1.167*** 
(0.16) 
1.167*** 
(0.16) 
Variance (country level) 
 
0.0604 
(0.11) 
 
 
 
 
0.01 
(0.07) 
 
 
 
 
Variance (university level - size) 
 
 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
0.00 
 (0.00) 
 
 
Variance (university level - ownership) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00 
 (0.00) 
 
 
 
 
0.00 
 (0.00) 
N 272  272  272  272  272  272  
LR test vs. logistic model (chi2) 0.77  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
p-value (chi 2) 0.18 0.98 0.98 0.18 0.98 0.98 
Log-likelihood -150.33 -120.03 -120.03 -120.03 -120.03 -120.03 
Note: Number of obs. 272 researchers. ***, ** and * Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  1171 
Source: Academic entrepreneurship survey data for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (collected 2015, 2016 and 2017). 1172 
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Appendix B1: List of interviewees included in this study 1174 
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associate professor 64 10 engineering 
product sales (without spinoff), public 
grants, consulting, honorarium 
private industry capital 60 industry public BY No 
assistant professor 27 1 social public grants, honorarium foreign grants, university 30 
other academic institutions, foreign 
institutions, other for profit and non-for-
profit 
public BY No 
research fellow 31 8 economics 
establishing a spin-off,  
product sales (without spinoff), public 
grants 
government grants, foreign 
grants, private industry 
capital 
80 
other academic institutions, foreign and 
public institutions, industry, profit and 
non-for-profit 
private BY Yes 
research fellow 60 39 chemistry 
licencing patents, public grants, 
 consulting, honorarium 
government grants 2.6 
other academic institutions, foreign 
institutions, industry, other for profit and 
non-for-profit 
public BY Yes 
full professor 66 47 economics 
product sales (without spinoff), 
 public grants, honorarium 
foreign grants, university 10 
other academic institutions, foreign 
institutions, industry 
public BY Yes 
full professor 60 35 economics 
product sales (without spinoff), public 
grants, consulting, honorarium 
foreign grants, university 10 foreign institutions, industry public BY Yes 
associate professor 37 15 economics public grants, honorarium 
government grants, 
university, self 
5 
other academic institutions, foreign 
institutions 
public BY No 
associate professor 33 6 social honorarium university, self 2 foreign institutions public BY No 
assistant professor 35 8 social consulting university 1 
public institutions, industry, other for 
profit and non-for-profit 
public BY Yes 
associate professor 51 27 engineering licencing patents private industry capital 25 foreign institutions public KZ Yes 
full professor 57 32 engineering public grants government grants 30 other academic institutions public KZ No 
full professor 57 36 biosciences honorarium university 80 Private Industry public KZ No 
assistant professor 26 4 economics public grants government grants 15 foreign institutions private KZ No 
full professor 64 40 food multiple government grants 10 Private industry private KZ Yes 
full professor 56 27 economics 
product sales (without spinoff), public 
grants, consulting 
government grants, self 10 public institutions, industry private KZ No 
full professor 50 20 law  public grants, honorarium 
government grants, 
university, self 
10 other academic institutions private KZ No 
full professor 47 27 
physics & 
math 
licencing patents, public grants, 
honorarium 
foreign grants, university, 
self 
1 
other academic institutions, foreign 
institutions, industry and professional 
associations, for profit and non-for-profit 
private KZ No 
full professor 61 37 economics public grants, honorarium 
government grants, 
university, self 
30 other academic institutions private KZ Yes 
full professor 60 36 medicine 
establishing a spin-off, product sales 
(without spinoff), public grants, 
honorarium 
government grants, foreign 
grants 
30 
other academic institutions, foreign and  
public institutions, other for profit and 
non-for-profit 
private KZ No 
assistant professor 40 5 engineering 
licencing patents, product sales (without 
spinoff), public grants 
private industry capital, 
university 
30 Private industry private KZ No 
 52 
full professor 69 35 
chemistry, 
medicine 
public grants, honorarium 
government grants, foreign 
grants 
50 
other academic institutions, foreign 
institutions 
public KZ No 
associate professor 35 10 medicine public grants, honorarium government grants, self 3 
other academic institutions, foreign 
institutions 
public KZ Yes 
full professor 50 27 biosciences establishing a spin-off, public grants government grants 10 other for profit and non-for-profit private KZ No 
research fellow 37 15 
engineering, 
physics & 
math 
establishing a spin-off, product sales 
(without spinoff),  
public grants, consulting 
government grants, private 
industry capital, university 
25 
other academic institutions, public 
institutions, , industry, other for profit and 
non-for-profit 
public AZ Yes 
associate professor 36 10 economics public grants, consulting 
foreign grants, private 
industry capital 
40 
foreign institutions, industry and 
professional associations 
public AZ No 
associate professor 42 20 economics 
establishing a spin-off, product sales 
(without spinoff),  public grants, 
consulting, honorarium 
foreign grants, private 
industry capital, affiliated 
university, self 
20 
other academic institutions, industry and 
professional associations, industry, other 
for profit and non-for-profit 
private AZ Yes 
research fellow 33 6 social 
licencing patents, establishing a spin-off,  
product sales (without spinoff), public 
grants, consulting 
foreign grants, private 
industry capital 
5 foreign institutions private AZ Yes 
Note: Interviewee names are not disclosed.  1175 
Source: Academic entrepreneurship in Belarus (BY), Kazakhstan (KZ) and Azerbaijan (AZ) project interviews 1176 
 53 
Appendix B2. Interview Protocol 1177 
 1178 
Background and Overview of the researcher  1179 
Please note, before the interview, the interviewer may be able to gather much of the data for this 1180 
section from the participating respondent. In fact, it is strongly recommended collecting this data as 1181 
soon as possible, as these data are important for drawing inference across field of research, type of 1182 
commercialization, partner in research commercialization and respondent’s individual 1183 
characteristics. 1184 
Eligibility criteria to participate in this interview. Please confirm: 1185 
1. You commercialise knowledge and technology created at the university (Yes/No).  1186 
2. You are actively involved in any of the research commercialization activity (e.g. 1187 
establishing a spin-off, product sales (without spinoff),  public grants, consulting, honorarium) with 1188 
a share of commercialization in total income greater than zero (Yes/No).  1189 
3. Your research is sponsored by at least one external collaboration partner (e.g. university, 1190 
government, foreign, private industry in addition to self-sponsorship if any) (Yes/No).  1191 
Interview questions 1192 
 What is your name? What is your position at university?  1193 
 How many works have published over the last 5 years, including industry publications with 1194 
practitioners? 1195 
 What is your field of research? What is a secondary or complementary field of research? 1196 
 Do you know if any of your academic colleagues commercialize their research?   1197 
 Can you say that your university and country business environment is friendly towards the 1198 
idea of academic entrepreneurship?  1199 
 Do you feel an increase of research to teaching  ratio would increase your commercialisation 1200 
capacity and income and why? 1201 
 What barriers do you face in commercializing your research from the department/ faculty 1202 
level, from university level, from business environment? 1203 
 What is the most substantial source of commercialization of your research from the 1204 
following licensing of the patents, running spin-off company, selling products without starting spin-1205 
off, getting grants, consulting activity,  getting honorarium for books, conferences, lections other? 1206 
 In case of positive commercialization we ask: How do you protect your IP?  1207 
In case of no commercialization we ask: If you were to start an own business to commercialize your 1208 
research what are the factors which prevent you from this:  financial (economies of scale, taxes) ; 1209 
administrative and institutional (corruption, doing business conditions), external support or no 1210 
support (venture and angel investors, crowdfunding, etc.) 1211 
 What do you think should be done to enable researchers establish own business (Spinoffs)?  1212 
 Please name one or two preferred external partners in commercialization of your research? 1213 
 How often do you collaborate with Technology transfer offices (TTO) at your university? 1214 
 What are the major challenges you experience when collaboration with TTO? 1215 
 What could be improved in the work of TTO to make them more effective?  1216 
 Should TTO be a middleman (entrepreneur) between you and a company interested in your 1217 
research? Who is there instead of TTO to help you linking to business (techno parks, incubators, 1218 
business networks, professional association, etc.)? 1219 
 Please list one or two most important external sponsors for your research  1220 
 Would you like to name few recommendations, which in your opinion, could be quickly 1221 
implemented by policy-makers and university administration?________________ 1222 
We thank you for your time and collaboration.  1223 
